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COOPERATIVE ACTION IN ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL
DWIGHT C. SMITH, JR.
Mr. Smith received his B.A. degree with honors from Yale University in 1951, and M.P.A. degree
from Syracuse University in 1953. He served for three years in the Army Counter Intelligence
Corps, and since then has served in state government positions in Connecticut, Maryland, Indiana
and New York. From 1965 to 1967, as Assistant Deputy Director for Systems Planning and Re-
search, he supervised the initial definition studies for an organized crime intelligence capability
for the New York State Identification and Intelligence System. During this period he was also
principal recorder for the Oyster Bay Conferences on Organized Crime. He has been a consultant
to the Indianapolis and Chicago Police Departments, and has served as Visiting Associate Pro-
fessor of Police Science at the John Jay College of Criminal justice, presenting the seminar on
"Organized Crime in America."
In this paper, Mr. Smith reviews some research into the organization of organized crime control,
undertaken in 1966-67 by the New York State Identification and Intelligence System. He identifies
some unexplored and unanswered questions that concern the problems of cooperative planning and
action against organized crime, and suggests how these questions may affect the activities of a
State organized crime prevention council established under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1967.
Mr. Smith is presently Director of Institutional Research at the State University of New York
at Albany.
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1967 has presented state governments with a
new tool for approaching the problem of organized
crime. Sandwiched in Title I of the Act between
references to specialized organized crime intelli-
gence and prosecution units, and to systems for
information-sharing, is the "State organized crime
prevention council",' defined as a group of not
more than seven persons "broadly representative
of law enforcement officials... [who] by virtue
of their training or experience shall be knowledge-
able in the prevention and control of organized
crime".2 The Act neither specifies a council's ob-
jectives (other than "organized crime prevention")
nor suggests its manner of operation. The judiciary
Committee's report to the Senate, in commenting
on the organized crime aspects of Title I refers to
the final report of the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
but none of the references-and, indeed, none
anywhere else in that report or in the published
consultant papers-concerns a State organized
crime prevention council or any similar mechanism
of government. The report does, on the other hand,
explain the intent of the Act concerning the special
I Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1967, § 301(b)(5), 82 Stat. 200.
2 Id. § 601(g), 82 Stat. 209.
law enforcement units and systems for information-
sharing.3
The Commission recommended that states or-
ganize and finance organized crime investigation
commissions, and that private citizen crime com-
missions be encouraged,4 but these mechanisms
are clearly different in membership and, by in-
direct implication, in duties, from the proposed
State organized crime prevention councils. The
subcommittee hearings on the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act offer no further light
on the councils.' Despite this lack of guidance, the
Act's appropriation authorization for fiscal 1968
and 1969 would permit a State council to obtain as
much as $1 million of support for organized crime-
related activities carried out either directly by the
3 S. lEP. No. 1097, from the Committee on the
judiciary, April 29, 1968, pp. 33-34.
4 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of justice, Task Force Report: Organized
Crime (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1967), p. 23.
5 Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law
Enforcement, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary; and Anti-crime Program, Hearings Before
Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary.
With only occasional exceptions, references to organized
crime at these hearings concerned wiretapping and
electronic surveillance.
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council or through agencies of its individual mem-
bers. 6
To provide some perspective for considering the
organization and duties of a council, it may be
useful to describe some research conducted in New
York State during 1966 and 1967 concerning the
general subject of "interjurisdictional mechanisms
for organized crime control". This research was
undertaken in conjunction with a series of five
conferences on organized crime, held at the former
Coe Estate in Oyster Bay, Long Island. The
broad objective of the conferences was to explore
ways in which the law enforcement community
might work, as single agencies or in partnership, to
prevent, control or reduce the influence of or-
ganized crime in American society. The discussion
began with a basic agreement'on what was meant
by "organized crime". The conclusions reached-
or, perhaps more importantly, the aspects of the
problem that were not explored-are beyond the
scope of this paper. It is sufficient to say that a
rudimentary definition was accepted, from which a
second question might be tackled: what should
governments do about organized crime in their
iurisdictions?
It was assumed at the outset that action de-
pended on knowledge and, thus, that a key element
in what might be done was the development of
effective intelligence activities.8 The discussion
took an interesting turn at this point, when it was
suggested that there might be some guidelines for
action in the history of the national intelligence
community. From a review of the literature in the
field, and from interviews with experienced na-
tional intelligence personnel, it became evident that
some guidelines were available, and a preliminary
effort was made to put them in terms relevant to
6 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1967, § 520(b)(2), 82 Stat. 208.
7 The conferences were sponsored jointly by the
Executive Chamber of the State of New York, the
School of Criminal Justice of the State University of
New York at Albany, and the Police Department of the
City of New York. The first two conferences are
described in Combating Organized Crime, a report of the
1965 Oyster Bay conferences on combating organized
crime (Albany, New York: Office of the Counsel to the
Governor, April 1966).
8 Among the activities discussed, in terms of existing
as well as prospective law enforcement techniques, were
special intelligence and prosecution units dealing with
organized crime cases and systems for information
sharing-the "bookends" which support the Stateorganized crime prevention council in Title I of the
1967 Act. See Combating Organised Crime, supra note 7,
esp. pp. 45-52.
organized crime control.9 If the operating concepts
of strategic intelligence described there were to be
applied to organized crime control, however, some
means would have to be developed for translating
into a radically different environment the functions
performed on an international scale by a series of
coordinating agencies: the National Security
Council, and the Board of National Estimates and
its supporting intelligence apparatus.
The nature of the translation process was, with-
out question, difficult to conceive. How could the
law enforcement community develop a structure to
deal interjurisdictionally with policy questions of
long-range (or strategic) import relating to orga-
nized crime? As a starting point, a question was
posed concerning the feasibility of a national
organized crime intelligence board, established on a
voluntary basis and representative of all levels of
government. The question was discussed at some
length in terms of uniform laws, interstate com-
pacts, and other recognized and less formal co-
operative mechanisms. It may be fair to say that
the problems facing interjurisdictional cooperation
-- either laterally between agencies at the local,
state or national level, or vertically among all
levels of government-loomed larger in the dis-
cussion than the potential benefits awaiting the
successful cooperators. Nevertheless, there re-
mained a strong feeling that government in
general (it was recognized that organized crime
control cannot be the exclusive concern of law en-
forcement agencies) had to begin groping beyond
existing, inadequate efforts at inter-agency co-
operation, and it was agreed that a rationale should
be developed, as a basis for further discussion, for a
National Organized Crime Intelligence Board.
The results of that effort are contained in the
sections that follow.'
The reader will note that the singular "board"
referred to in the title of this proposal is not wholly
descriptive of the plural "interjurisdictional
mechanisms" described in the body of the analysis;
the significance of that difference, and an assess-
ment of the analysis as a whole and some questions
9 See A Theory of Organized Crime Control: A Pre-
liminary Statement, prepared by the technical staff and
consultants of the New York State Identification and
Intelligence System, as a background paper for the Third
Oyster Bay Conference (Albany, New York: NYSIIS,
April 1966).
10 This material is taken from an unpublished
manuscript by Lumbard and Smith, A Proposal for a
National Organized Crime Intelligence Board (Albany,
New York: April 1967).
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it poses indirectly for a State organized crime pre-
vention council, comprise the concluding sections
of this paper.
A NATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME INTELLIGENCE
BoARn: Thn CHALLENGE
The threat of organized crime to American
society has increased in the last thirty years
while the directions and extent of its growth
have changed. From a relatively crude and violent
conspiracy focused upon crimes of vice-bootleg
liquor, narcotics, gambling and prostitution-
organized crime has become a sophisticated and
often subtle enterprise intent also upon making
substantial inroads into legitimate business
through labor racketeering, extortion, price
manipulation, restraints on trade and other forms
of business crime. Although its perpetuation rests
upon the potential use of violence to control its
activities, the size, power and wealth it has amassed
require increasingly fewer, and less visible, mani-
festations of force. It now possesses enormous cap-
ital resources. Lower level organized crime mem-
bers continue to engage in those forms of overt
criminal conduct normally associated with "crime
in the streets", although on a very selective basis.
Their leaders increasingly are insulated from such
acts.
Organized crime caters to the desires of a sub-
stantial part of our citizenry. Therein lies its
threat to society. It satisfies those desires through
willful disregard of the law and-even more im-
portantly-by rejecting the standards of fair
competition and equality of opportunity upon
which a free society is based. In so doing, it en-
courages the corrosion of basic standards of
personal and corporate conduct that are essential
to a democracy. And it is the prime corrupting
force in our midst.
Present efforts to control organized crime are
limited. The reasons are many; among them:
A fragmented criminal justice system;
Inadequate intelligence concerning organized
crime activities;
Diffusion of responsibility;
Lack of coordinated efforts;
Weak or confused local police jurisdictional
units;
Political interference with police administra-
tion;
Corruption of public officials and police;
Insufficient state-level concern with local law
enforcement;
Public willingness to accept the goods or
services of organized crime despite their
illegality.
Significant progress in the control of organized
crime will require major changes, including ad-
vances in technology and organization, and modi-
fications of attitudes and practices, in virtually
every named area. Thus the challenge of organized
crime control.is both important and substantial.
Even if public attitudes toward organized crime
were less receptive to its continued growth, how-
ever, it is evident that law enforcement generally
is not well organized or equipped to participate
effectively in a massive control program.
Law enforcement efforts today can be char-
acterized as relatively isolated and jurisdictionally
limited "holding actions". Some law enforcement
representatives understand the problem of or-
ganized crime and have invested significant re-
sources in control activities. But their effectiveness
all too often is discouragingly small because the
activities of organized crime often are so much
wider than the jurisdiction of enforcement agencies.
Whenever a specific control program presses hard,
the successful criminal organization can, if it
chooses-thanks to the ease of travel today-
temporarily withdraw portions of its resources and
personnel to unaffected areas while it awaits the
return of more favorable conditions. Indeed, some
organized crime groups have become sufficiently
wealthy and versatile to support flexibility as to
both activity and geography.
It has become increasingly evident that law en-
forcement efforts to control organized crime prob-
ably will remain at a relatively ineffective level
until four conditions are present:
1. Enforcement authorities really know what
it is they are trying to control;
2. They know what to do about it;
3. They have adequate information on which
to base decision-making and action; and
4. They are willing to work together despite
organizational and jurisdictional divisions
and confusion.
Enforcement authorities will need determination
and a high spirit of cooperation to jointly force
their way through these problems. Development of
an effective attack on organized crime itself also
1968]
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will take patience-and time. New mechanisms
and strategies must be devised; new attitudes and
understandings must be encouraged.
Within our federal system a new start can be
made. To prepare for the time when an effective
attack will be a reality, to provide a foundation for
that attack and to promote action that will hasten
that day, we can begin now to initiate measures to
overcome the fundamental weaknesses of present
enforcement. Efforts should be focused upon:
A. Organizational fragmentation, with ac-
companying absence of coordination;
B. lack of plans designed to attack organized
crime itself, rather than its fringe symp-
toms or manifestations;
C. lack of "strategic intelligence" upon which
to base plans; and
D. absence of effective mechanisms for shar-
ing information pertinent to planning and
organized crime control.
Three separate but inter-related mechanisms
ultimately will be required to overcome these
significant weaknesses:
1. An inter-jurisdictional group to coordinate
strategic planning;
2. A channel through which strategic esti-
mates concerning organized crime-a prime
requisite for proper strategic planning and
interjurisdictional coordination-can be
coordinated and reviewed;
3. The means for sharing pertinent data across
the organizational and jurisdictional lines.
TEE RESPONSE: I. AN INTER-JURISDICTIONAL
GROUP TO COORDINATE STRATEGIC PLANNING
The group should be composed of representatives
from those jurisdictions that recognize the or-
ganized crime problem facing them and want to
work together-despite organizational limits-to
mount a more effective, coordinated attack on
organized crime. The members should represent
political jurisdictions and not merely action
agencies (although individually, representatives
might hold responsible positions in such agencies),
to insure program support of responsible govern-
ment policymakers and leaders. At first the group
might be relatively small, because the jurisdictions
now possessing sufficient knowledge of the problem
and expertise for its solution are small in number.
Although the group itself would possess final
authority to seat additional representatives, its
ultimate membership would be open to all states,
every major metropolitan community and the
federal government.
The group would have no operating authority.
Its major purpose would be to help develop and
coordinate, on a voluntary and cooperative basis,
strategies and plans to attack and control organized
crime. Its work would depend in large measure
upon a broader and deeper understanding of
organized crime, including its intentions and
capabilities, than presently exists. Consequently,
its immediate goals would center around the en-
couragement and development of more and better
intelligence resources in agencies responsible for
combating organized crime. For that purpose the
group would promote further research into such
subjects as organized crime itself; the intelligence
process as it relates to organized crime control; the
needs for personnel recruitment and training in the
intelligence field; and the classification and security
requirements of such a limited-purpose,, inter-
jurisdictional intelligence network. The results of
this research, as well as the research process itself,
would contribute significantly to building an
intelligence community that could support "a
more effective, coordinated attack on organized
crime".
Cost of the inter-jurisdictional group would not
be high. It would not maintain central files; its
permanent secretariat would not be large; and
expenses for meetings could be met, for the most
part, by travel costs paid by each representative's
home jurisdiction. The number of meetings would
be governed by the size and complexity of its
agenda. Initially, its meetings might occur semi-
annually. As its workload grew, the frequency of
meetings might be monthly. To establish direction,
to maintain continuity of proceedings, and to
provide guidance to its secretariat, it is likely that
the group would, of necessity, be more active in the
business of inter-jurisdictional coordination than
the parent group.
Although the cost of the inter-jurisdictional
coordinating group would be relatively small, it is
essential that its resources be sufficient for its
responsibilities. In particular, adequate support
would be needed for communications. The secre-
tariat should be adequately staffed at the secre-
tarial level; equally important, though, would be
its professional staff. Since the group 'would be
voluntary, it would not be able to rely on direct
organizational authority to encourage implementa-
tion of its policies or the maintenance of momen-
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turn on specific projects between regular meetings.
A truly cooperative spirit would have to be en-
gendered in the face of the inherent, primary
loyalty of each member to his own jurisdiction and
responsibilities. Thus the coordinating group would
need a staff whose primary loyalties were to its
own activities if it were to possess the energy that a
dynamic organized crime control program requires.
The initial cost of the inter-jurisdictional group
might well be underwritten by a grant (LEAA or
foundation), as a demonstration or experimental
project. After a reasonable period its value and
merit should be sufficiently demonstrated to justify
regularly budgeted support from the jurisdictions
represented. This approach has been used suc-
cessfully to launch innovative programs in other
areas of government.
THE RESPONSE: II. A CHANNEL THROUGH
WimcH STRATEGIC EsT=IMTES CAN BE
COORDINATED AND REVIEWED
It is axiomatic that good strategic planning de-
pends upon good strategic intelligence activities.
If the inter-jurisdictional coordinating group were
to fulfill its major purpose to "help develop and
coordinate. . . strategies and plans", it would need
access to adequate intelligence estimates covering
a broad spectrum of potential organized crime
activity and law enforcement response. Those es-
timates would depend, in turn, upon the availa-
bility of intelligence information to substantiate
every element of each estimate.
It is anticipated that the great bulk of organized
crime intelligence work would be conducted under
the direction of local, state or regional intelligence
units, or by the investigative forces of appropriate
federal agencies. The inter-jurisdictional coordinat-
ing group would not be engaged in intelligence re-
search because it would not have its own basic data
files. Some mechanism should be created by which
strategic intelligence products developed elsewhere
can be assembled, assessed and integrated into a
consistent set of estimates from which the inter-
jurisdictional coordination group could work.
That channel might utilize the secretariat of the
inter-jurisdictional coordinating group. To assist in
the assessment and integration of separate research
efforts into a consistent estimate of organized crime
activities, a voluntary "estimates review" group
should be created, composed in part of representa-
tives of the major intelligence units from which
intelligence products would be obtained.
It is important that a distinction be made and
observed between the estimates review group and
the inter-jurisdictional coordinating group. An
established and fundamental doctrine of strategic
intelligence work-of which the final estimating
process is the most sensitive aspect-is that it
must be conducted apart from the determination of
program and policy alternatives that will guide
subsequent action. Otherwise, estimates run the
risk of reflecting policy desires rather than ob-
jective reality. At the same time, the estimating
process must be dose enough to policy to be timely
and useful. As Sherman Kent has put it, "Intelli-
gence must be close enough to policy, plans and
operations to have the greatest amount of guid-
ance, and must not be so dose that it loses it
objectivity and integrity of judgment".,
Several questions may immediately occur. Since
the assessment of strategic estimates entails the
potential-albeit infrequently or rarely exercised--
need for access to the original source data, does the
establishment of an estimates review group imply
the creation in fact, if not in name, of a national
dossier file concerning organized criminals? Even
though files are not consolidated under the secre-
tariat to the inter-jurisdictional coordinating
group, would the potential opportunity of a cen-
tral staff to examine local files in relation to spe-
cific intelligence questions also create an opportu-
nity for that central staff to function as if there
were a central file by routinely soliciting all con-
tributing agencies for information about certain
individuals?
The nature of intelligence work and the or-
ganized crime control environment suggest that
these problem areas are highly unlikely, and even
impractical, under the voluntary system proposed
here. The estimates review group would meet to
consider stated problems. Since it would include
among its number representatives of the primary
intelligence units whose estimates were to be
consolidated and reviewed, disputed points in a
report could be clarified by the representative of
the agency responsible for the report, without
reference by the central group to any separate
files. In those instances where a dispute could not
be resolved at the review level, clarification could
be requested from the local agency. The request
could be met by a central group representative
appearing at the local agency to inspect pertinent
data, which would not then be forwarded to any
central file or indeed ever leave the local repository.
I' KENT, STrATEGIC INTELLIGENCE 180 (1949).
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Thus information would be available in the same
manner in which it is presently available, but with
a more effective system of interchange and access
due to the index and coordination functions that
would be possible. More data might thus be used
from a wider range of agencies because the sources
would be better known; a central pool of detailed
personal data, accessible on rapid notice, would not
result.
Establishment of an estimates review group
would not be required immediately. Such a group
would be required when there was sufficient
meaningful intelligence being generated to justify
its creation. That time would depend upon the rate
of success at which the inter-jurisdictional coor-
dinating group promoted useful intelligence work
among its members.
THE RESPONSE: III. Tun MEANS POR
SnARING PERTINENT DATA
It is widely recognized that separate agencies,
operating independently and despite the best of
intentions, do not obtain all information pertinent
to a specific organized crime case because much of
that information cannot be obtained locally or by
its own investigators. This difficulty reflects the
disparity between the fragmented and static
boundaries of law enforcement agencies and the
fluid nature of organized crime. The difficulty of
obtaining information from outside sources stems
from two fundamental problems: the absence of a
sharing mechanism and the consequent reluctance
of many persons to circulate what they consider
"sensitive" material; and the problem of deter-
mining, in many instances, what information will
be pertinent elsewhere.
Sharing of sensitive information between in-
telligence units today is limited almost entirely to
the release of selected data on a case-by-case basis
to a personally known and trusted individual in
another agency. Seldom, if ever, does an agency
possessing sensitive data that might be useful else-
where initiate the information exchange. Rather,
the general practice is to wait for a request for the
information. To some extent, the general attitude
toward sharing is dominated by a local work load so
heavy as to leave little room for volunteering help
to another agency-especially on a miscellaneous
basis without specific direction. And there is ob-
vious concern for guaranteeing the privacy and
protection of information, a concern usually ex-
pressed as "security".
To have adequate "security" a feasible dassifi-
cation system would have to be developed, as well
as related rules for safeguarding information in
relation to its classification and for clearing
personnel for access to levels of information. On
the basis of a classification system it would be
possible to develop a voluntary mechanism for
regulating the application of inter-jurisdictional
security rules in each participating agency and-
once security were better understood and ob-
served-for encouraging more frequent and wider
dissemination of information. As mentioned above,
an early and important responsibility of the inter-
juristictional coordinating group would be the
sponsorship and encouragement of studies aimed
at preparing a classification system.
Development of the mechanism for sharing in-
formation would not answer the question of
determining when an innocent-appearing piece of
data might be useful to another jurisdiction. The
best sharing mechanism possible will not of itself
guarantee the dissemination of data if its impor-
tance is not realized. The answer may rest in the
development of a series of "identifiers"--known to
intelligence experts as "essential elements of in-
formation"--that could be circulated to agencies
routinely collecting information. With that list
in hand, collection agencies would have some idea
of the interests of other agencies in data obtained.
Undoubtedly some of those identifiers would
themselves be considered "sensitive", particularly
if they identified subjects of a case or an intelligence
project still under development. The design and
implementation of a classification system would
help overcome this limitation. The inter-jurisdic-
tional coordinating group could thus develop a list
of essential elements of information, as a second
responsibility flowing from its studies of a classifi-
cation system. Once these two problems were
solved the way would be clear to a significant in-
crease in the sharing of organized crime intelligence
information on a national basis.
SOM -E UNANSWERED PROBLEMS1 2
Admittedly, this approach to the problem leaves
several matters unanswered or undefined. Some
omissions reflect the limits of time and space, as
well as the preliminary and tentative nature of the
proposal. Some sketchy definitions reflect a desire
not to be exclusive and a concern to avoid pre-
disposing some important policy questions. The
12 The opinions expressed in this section are those of
the author only, and do not necessarily reflect the views




intentionally vague description of an "interjuris-
dictional group... composed of representatives of
those jurisdictions that recognize the organized
crime problem. .." provides examples of this:
a. Despite the specification of its title, the
proposal assumed that cooperation might
be undertaken on several levels-between
states, or among several governmental
agencies operating in the same geographic
area, as well as nation-wide. A common
logic that did not specify a level of action
might assist all such efforts. Hence, the use
of "interjurisdictional".
b. There was a range of opinion concerning
the locus of representation; the matter was
not pressed beyond "jurisdiction". Would a
large police department belong, represented
by its chief or commissioner, or would the
parent city be a member, represented by
its chief political officer or his delegate?
Would a large county be represented by its
sheriff or by the county attorney, and how
would a choice be made if both were in-
dependently elected? Would the federal
law enforcement community be represented
by the justice Department or the Treasury
Department-or the White House? Or
would federal representation be decided
among the FBI, the Organized Crime and
Racketeering Division of the Justice De-
partment, or the Internal Revenue Service?
Several of these choices were illustrated
within the group of conferees at Oyster
Bay. The final proposal specified that
members "should represent political juris-
dictions and not merely action agencies,"
but this language did not provide a com-
plete answer.
c. There was also a feeling that competence in
the field was not uniform; membership,
therefore, should be self-determined, by
"those jurisdictions that recognize the...
problem". If organized crime control re-
quires action at all levels of government;
if there is, in this field of law enforcement,
a felt need among competent officials to
"be in the big game;" and if some agencies
or jurisdictions might well be represented
by more than one person; then a group of
100 to 150 delegates might easily be as-
sembled. Such a group undoubtedly would
be unwieldly; it would also probably in-
dude uninterested participants. A nucleus
of serious workers would emerge, but it
would take time. The same result might
be achieved more simply, however, by
extending the initial invitation only to
organizations aware of the problem and
interested in cooperative action. But who
would say that a certain jurisdiction was
aware and interested? When the alterna-
tives were put this way, self-selection was
clearly the more discreet approach.
d. The gathering was designated as a "group"
in deference to the problem of authority
(a factor as well in specifying self-selection
for membership). Either "board" or "com-
mittee" implied a degree of authority and
of sanctioned existence that was beyond the
competence of the original discussants.
Hesitation at this point reflected the un-
official, voluntary nature of the Oyster Bay
gathering; it also reflected the "fragmented
criminal justice system" and the "dif-
fusion of responsibility" limitations to
which the preamble of the proposal re-
ferred."'
There were also several questions raised in pre-
liminary discussions but not adequately explored
in the proposal. Within the general problem of
authority, what would the group be expected to
do, and what conclusions would it reach? Would it
deal with general conditions or specific situations--
that is, would its primary focus be strategic or
tactical? The proposal speaks of "strategic intelli-
gence", but what does that mean in terms of
specific projects? What levels or areas of informa-
tion exchange would be appropriate for group
action? With whom would the group communicate:
its member agencies, or other public officials in
various branches of government, or with the public
13 The problem of authority is critical. If the perti-
nent members of a voluntary association agree to a
common action, there may be no problem. But if one
member disagrees, or if he (or his agency) perform
below expectations, how will mediation proceed, and
what sanctions can be applied? What if the disagree-
ment is between two authoritative and respected men,
and what if it concerns a vital link in a long and ar-
duously developed strategic plan? We need look no
further than last June for an example of the problem.
Assuming the newspaper accotints to be reasonably
accurate, how might a voluntary coordinating group
have mediated between Frank Hogan and Robert
Morgenthau over the immunity of witnesses in con-
spiracy trials? See Prosectors in Conflict Over the
Marcus Case, New York Times, June 27, 1968; Treat-
ment of Informers, Id., June 28, 1968; and related news
stories.
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generally? How would answers to these questions
depend on the level of the group (national or
regional) and the extent and nature of its active
membership-and how, for that matter, might
several levels of cooperation be instituted?
In some respects it is unfortunate that the basic
concepts could not have been pushed to the level
of hypothesis that these questions required. The
rationale for cooperative action was dear, and the
framework for initiating it was sufficiently tangible.
But what would it really accomplish? What would
it be able to do better than existing mechanisms-
the LEIU, for example, 14 or conventional, bilateral
working agreements between trusted associates?
What benefit would the cooperating agency gain
from its efforts? Because the proposal did not reach
this level of inquiry, the discussion halted, and the
concept was not explored further.
Beyond these questions about the proposal it-
self, it seems evident that the discussion was
characterized by a fundamental lack of consensus
on two points: should cooperation be imposed from
above,. or should it grow from below; and what did
it mean, in the area of organized crime control, to
speak of strategic rather than tactical intelligence?
The idea of cooperation imposed from above was
implicit in the specification of "national" and
"board" in the title applied to the proposal. The
moral imperatives of organized crime control re-
quired, from this viewpoint, immediate cooperative
efforts on a large scale; once those imperatives were
dearly understood, independent agencies would
certainly bend their efforts toward a national
strategy. This was not the view of some law en-
forcement officials, however. To think in such
global terms demanded a leap of faith they were
not prepared to take on the basis of the prospective
benefits that were described. That skepticism was
reinforced by strong feelings that large efforts were
most likely to grow from the experiences of more
modest beginnings, and by a conviction that state
or regional mechanisms were a prerequisite to
nation-wide efforts. The unexplored question that
lay between these points of view was dear: given
the outreach of organized crime activities, how
broad did a cooperative effort have to be to achieve
any success at all? That question is not likely to be
answered until some intensive research is under-
taken into the real nature of organized crime.
The problem of strategic intelligence as some-
14 For a discussion of the LEIU (Law Enforcement
Intelligence Unit), see Combating Organized Crin,
supra note 7, at 46-47.
thing different from tactical intelligence is also
implicit in the title. The proposal refers to three
distinct but interrelated mechanisms: the title
specifies only one. It identifies, in effect, the group
that would coordinate strategic planning; it
ignores or subsumes within the board's structure
the channels for strategic intelligence and the
mechanisms for information exchange.
Within the tactical experience of most law en-
forcement agencies, a unitary intelligence struc-
ture is meaningful: the agency head is concerned
about getting pertinent, hard facts into the hands
of his operating staff, and the niceties of the higher
level intelligence organization are irrelevant. For
the expert in strategic intelligence, however, the
organizational distinctions between intelligence
research, policy determination and action are es-
sential. In his view, one cannot speak realistically
of a policy board without simultaneously and
separately identifying a strategic intelligence group
and the channels through information and intelli-
gence would move. By ignoring them, one ignores
the sine qua non of strategic intelligence: an ef-
fective balance between "guidance" from the
policy maker and objectivity and integrity within
the intelligence process.
CONCLUSION
The State organized crime prevention council
concept could represent a first step toward the
interjurisdictional mechanisms described here.
If some states take advantage of the Congressional
invitation, and if the funding carrot enables them
to experiment with new and more sophisticated ap-
proaches to coordination and control than present
efforts represent, they may evolve an effective
framework for nation-wide coordination of organ-
ized crime control.
The enabling Act answers two of the questions
raised in this proposal; it has specified the state as a
coordinating level and has placed a limit on formal
council membership. If a council really means to be
serious about organized crime control-i.e., is
willing to take a fresh look at the nature of or-
ganized crime and the relative merits of alternative
strategies for dealing with it-it cannot avoid the
remaining questions. They can be answered, but
the task will not be easy. Progress will be slow, the
path of action is virtually uncharted and there is
no guarantee of success. The alternative, however,
is a "more of the same" approach which has yet to
put a significant and permanent dent in the
organized crime structure in this country.
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